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JUDICIAL ARTICLES 
Jeffrey A Parness* 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Differences in the establishment and empowerment of American 
judicial systems should trigger variations in the ways in which cases 
are handled and law is practiced. Such differences are found in the 
sections of state constitutions dealing with the judiciary and known 
as judicial articles. Unfortunately, those differences are often over-
looked. Perhaps the oversight is partially attributable to the widely-
held view that any variations in the constitutional foundations of 
judicial systems are meaningless, in that no practical consequences 
flow from them. In effect this view parallels the popular notion that 
all seemingly comparable branches of state governments actually 
have comparable powers, and that whatever differences exist 
originate chiefly from such non-constitutional sources as political 
ideology and community setting. A circuit court is a circuit court is a 
circuit court. When you've seen one intermediate appellate court, 
you've seen them all. Those sentiments are troubling because the 
differences in state judicial articles are meaningful and should 
result in significant consequences in judicial powers. Under current 
American constitutional law, all trial courts do not possess the same 
power to make substantive law; all high courts do not possess the 
same authority to regulate the practice of law; and all judges do not 
possess the same responsibility for checking legislative conduct. 
This article will first explore some of the current differences in 
state judicial articles, as well as some of the historical changes in the 
judicial article of illinois. The article will then highlight a few of the 
consequences that should flow from those differences. A brief 
discussion of a few problems in differentiating state judicial articles 
will conclude this article. In calling for more attention to consti-
tutional language, this paper urges that as there has developed an 
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increased sensitivity to the differences in individual rights from one 
American state to another, there should also develop a heightened 
recognition of and respect for variations in the structure, function 
and operation of American judicial systems. 
II. CONTEMPORARY STATE JUDICIAL ARTICLES AND THEIR HISTORY 
A Comparing State Judicial Articles 
A comparison of contemporary state judicial articles reveals 
diverse approaches to the allocation and use of judicial power. State 
constitutional provisions dealing ·with court structure and judicial 
rulemaking are illustrative of this diversity. 
Provisions on court structure vary ,videly in the extent of 
responsibility accorded legislatures to establish or empower courts. 
In lliinois, there is little room for legislation because the lliinois 
Constitution vests the judicial power "in a Supreme Court, an 
Appellate Court and Circuit Court,"1 and defines nearly all of these 
courts' jurisdictional authority.2 By contrast, other state consti-
tutions grant enormous legislative responsibility over the judiciary. 
For example, both the Rhode Island3 and Maine4 constitutions vest 
judicial power in a supreme court and in such inferior courts as the 
general assembly may establish. 
Most state constitutions fall between those extremes. Those 
constitutions typically create and empower some, but not all, courts, 
often at the appellate level. The typical state constitution also allows 
for some legislative influence on these courts and, yet, permits greater 
legislative initiatives in creating and empowering other courts, 
particularly trial courts oflimited jurisdiction. Michigan, for instance, 
allocates judicial power to "one supreme court, one court of appeals, 
one trial court ... one probate court, and courts 
of limited jurisdiction establish by a two-
thirds vote."5 resides in "a 
1 ILL. CONST. art VI, § 1. 
2 ILL. CONST. art. VI.§§ 4 (the Illinois defines the state Supreme 
Court's jurisdictional authority but allows the Court to provide by rule for 
appeals), 6 (legislature may provide for Court direct review of 
administrative action), and 9 (Circuit Courts original jurisdiction over all 
justiciable matters, but their power to revie\V administrative action is provided by 
law). 
3 RI. CONST. art. X, § 1. 
4 ME. CONST. art VI, § l. 
5 MICH. CONST. art. VI, § l. In Michigan, only the high court's jurisdiction is 
without significant legislative guidance. Id. at§§ 4. 10, 13. and 15. 
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such intermediate appellate courts as may be 
nrc-·,.,,·,irw,n by law, a superior court, such courts inferior to the superior 
as may be provided by law, and justice courts."6 
Although state constitutional provisions on court structure and 
jurisdiction vmy, the resulting judicial systems are frequently 
characterized similarly as "unified" or "integrated." Thus, the self-
proclaimed unified court system in Wisconsin encompasses the 
constitutionally-created supreme court, court of appeals and circuit 
court, as well as any legislatively-created municipal court or other 
courts of general jurisdiction.7 In North Carolina the unified 
s:vstem contains only the Appellate, Superior and District Court 
Divisions.8 The proclamation of unification in Idaho encompasses a 
supreme court, district courts and any other legislatively-created 
inferior courts,9 while in Georgia the unified system includes 
magistrate, probate, juvenile, state and superior courts that operate 
at the trial level.10 Thus, just as protections of privacy interests differ 
constitutionally from state to state, so, too, do the principles of court 
unification. 
State constitutional provisions on the rulemaking authority of 
the judiciary in areas such as civil, criminal and appellate procedure, 
evidence, and attorney and judicial conduct are equally divergent 
These provisions differ regarding the composition of judicial rule-
making bodies, as well as the oversight role of the legislature. 
Judicial rulemaking bodies encompass individuals or groups 
which contain at least a single judge and possess some decision-
making responsibility for rules affecting the judicial system.11 
Usually, such bodies are courts. Thus, many state high courts are 
recognized constitutionally as judicial rulemakers. State consti-
tutions often delegate to courts of last resort duties regarding civil, 
criminal, appellate and professional conduct rules. 12 In contrast, 
6 ARiz. CONST. art. VI, § 1. In Arizona legislation pertaining to supreme court and 
superior court jurisdiction is apparently far more limited than legislation affecting 
the power of other courts. Id. at§§ 5, 9, 14, 16 and 32. 
7 WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 2. 
8 N.C. CONST. art. N, § 2. 
9 IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
lO GA CONST. art. VI,§§ 1, 2. 
11 For a review of types of American judicial rulemakers, see Parness and 
Manthey,PublicProcessandStateJudicialRulemaking, l PACEL.REv.121.125-27 
( 1980) (emphasizing the need for greater sensitivity to the stages of rulemaking and 
to the distinctions between fettered and unfettered rulemaking authority). 
12 See, e.g.,ALAsKACONST.art. N, § 15 (rulesgovemingtheadministrationofall 
courts, as well as rules governing practice and procedure in civil and criminal cases 
all courts); ARiz. CONST. art. 6, § 5 (rules relative to all procedural matters in any 
ARK CONST. amend. 28 (rules regulating the practice of law and the 
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California empowers a Judicial Council to adopt "rules for court 
administration, practice and procedure." The Judicial Council con-
tains judges from a variety of courts, as well as members of the state 
bar and a few legislators.13 In New York, the chief judge of the highest 
court has extensive rulemaking authority regarding "standards and 
administrative policies for general application throughout the 
state."14 
As with the establishment of judicial rulemaking bodies, state 
constitutions vary regarding the role of the legislature in overseeing 
judicial rulemaking. Some provisions mandate that judicial rules not 
contravene any existing statutes,15 while others dictate that judicial 
rules not conflict with statutes addressing only certain topics. 16 Yet, 
other provisions seemingly permit judicial rules to supersede 
statutes.17 
Beyond concern for existing statutes, state constitutions vary on 
whether judicial rulemakers must submit their rules to legislative 
review. In Ohio, proposed practice and procedure rules cannot take 
effect unless the GeneralAssembly has had the opportunity to adopt 
"a concurrent resolution of disapproval."18 In South Carolina, how-
ever, similar proposed rules take effect unless three-fifths of the 
members of each house disapprove of them. 19 
By contrast, some state constitutions provide for legislative 
oversight regarding the work of judicial rulemakers only after the 
rules take effect. In Florida, the Supreme Court can adopt rules of 
practice without seeking the approval of the legislature. However, 
these rules "may be repealed by general law enacted by two-thirds 
vote of the membership of each house."20 Likewise, in Maryland, 
similar judicial rules only have force "until rescinded, changed or 
professional conduct of attorneys at law); N.J. CONST. art VI,§ II (rules governing the 
administration of all courts and, subject to law, the practice and procedure in all 
such courts): N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (rules of procedure, including appellate 
procedure, for all courts. as well as rules and regulations for the admission to 
practice. conduct. disciplining. and disbarment of attorneys at law); OHIO CONST art. 
IV, § 5(a)( 1) (rules regarding general superintendence over all courts). 
13 CAL. CoNsT art. v1. § 6. 
14 N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 28. 
15 See, e.g .. 1A CONST. art \,1. § 5: Nm. CONST. art. Vl. § 25. 
16 Mo. CONST. art. 5. § 5 (rules cannot alter laws on evidence or the oral 
examination of witnesses). 
17 OHIO CONST. art. IV.§ 5(b) (laws in conflict with rules have no further force or 
effect). q. N.C. CONST. art. IV,§ 13(2) ("exclusive" high court authority to make rules 
for the Appellate Division). 
18 Omo CONST. art. IV,§ 5(B) (practice and procedure rules). 
19 S.C. CONST. art V, § 4 (practice and procedure rules). 
20 FIA CONST. art VI. § 2(a) (practice and procedure rules). 
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law."21 Also, in Montana procedure and 
conduct rules are "subject to the legis-
of the two sessions following promulgation."22 
Judicial Articles qf Illinois 
Many of the contemporary constitutional differences among 
states in court structure and judicial rulemaking are comparable to 
constitutional differences found within a particular state over a 
of time. For example, the illinois constitutional history on 
power reflects significant shifts in the balance of power 
between the 9eneral Assembly and the courts. 
TheillinoisConstitutionofl818,expresslygrantedbroadduties 
regarding the judiciary to the General Assembly. Most importantly, 
the Assembly had the power to ordain and establish courts inferior to 
supreme court.23 Under the illinois Constitution of 1848, the 
legislature's authori1y over the illinois courts was reduced. Thus, the 
General Assembly's total control over lower court structure was 
eliminated. A new constitutional provision created circuit courts and 
defined the jurisdiction of those courts.24 Coun1yjudges and justices 
of the peace, however, remained under legislative direction.25 
Under the 1870 amendments to the illinois Constitution a 
further erosion oflegislative authori1y transpired. For example, the 
new constitutional provisions on coun1y and probate courts dimin-
ished legislative control over these courts.26 Nevertheless, extensive 
legislative authori1y over some courts continued. Specifically, the 
1870 amendments recognized expressly the legislature's power to 
create inferior appellate courts and to establish certain probate 
courts.27 
General Assembly responsibili1y for the judiciary was further 
reduced in 1962. A new constitutional amendment declared, "The 
judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, an Appellate Court and 
Circuit Courts."28 No longer were lower courts to be established by 
statute. Other amendments wholly or substantially eliminated legis-
21 Mo. CONST. art. IV,§ 18(a) (practice and procedure rules). 
22 MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (practice and procedure, professional conduct, and 
appellate procedure rules). 
2 l ILL. CONST. of 1818 art. V, § 1. 
ILL. CONST. of 1848 art. V, § 8. 
!LL. CONST. of 1848 art. V, §§ 18, 19. 
CONST. of 1870 art. VI, §§ 18, 20. 
CONST. of 1870 art. VI, § 20. 
of 1870 art. VI,§ 1 (1962). 
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lative authority to define the subject-matter jurisdiction of lower 
courts.29 
The movement toward increased constitutional establishment 
and empowerment of illinois courts continued under the 1970 
constitution. Thus, while a 1962 amendment granted to the supreme 
court the authority to provide for certain appellate rules "subject to 
law hereafter enacted,"30 the 1970 constitution recognized such 
rulemaking without noting the impact oflegislation.31 
The trend in illinois is clear. Constitutional history from 1818 to 
1970 reflects diminishing General Assembly control over the judicial 
system. Over time, the legislature's power to create and empower 
courts has diminished. Increasingly, constitutional mandates ap-
peared, and, where ambiguous, judges usually interpreted the 
mandates. 
The llinois experience is comparable to developments in other 
American states. Such developments, in some part. are attributable 
to the push for more unified court systems (spurred by the American 
Bar Association. the American the National 
Municipal League. and 
today approach court 
Thus. the 
judiciaries on 
differ greatly, as in many 
individual states. 
In rulemaking, con-
siderable state judicial articles and in 
state exist in such areas as court financing, 
the selecting or removing judges, the terms of 
judicial and the judicial role in rendering advisory opinions. 
Some courts are state-financed, while others are locally-financed. 
Judges may be elected in partisan or non-partisan elections. They 
may serve terms ranging from 2 to 15 years. State high courts may or 
may not have the duty to advise the legislature or the governor on the 
legality of certain conduct. Variations in those areas result in further 
differences in separation of powers principles from state to state and 
in a single state over a period of time. 
29 Compare ILL.CONST.of 1870art. VI,§§ 11, 12, with ILL.CONST.of 1870art. VI,§§ 
7, 9 (1962) (legislature's authority over appellate and circuit court jurisdiction). 
3o ILL.CONST.of 1870 art VI,§ 5 (1962). 
31 ..J:LL. CONST art. VI, § 4(b ). 
32 Ashman and Parness, The Concept Qf a Unified Court System, 24 DEPAUL L. 
REv. 1 (1974) (tracing the unification movement). 
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variations between of the 
can occur over time in a single state's several 
arise. First, what impact do those differences in consti-
rhetoric have upon judicial systems? Second, might 
differences properly influence the resolution of troubling 
contemporary issues? 
Consider first state legislative authority to remove civil disputes 
courts and to place them within the jurisdiction of admin-
istrative agencies. Such removals are increasingly attractive to 
legislators concerned with the delays and costs of traditional 
Htigation. Legislatures are presently discussing removals for certain 
cases such as medical malpractice actions.33 Even with an 
ex1)ressly recognized right to trial by jwy, legislative removal of 
judicial jurisdiction should be easier for a state legislature which 
remains chiefly responsible for defining the business of the state's 
courts. Legislative removal is more problematic where the 
courts' jurisdiction over the diverted cases is constitutionally recog-
nized. Individual interests such as the right to jury trial are not the 
only limits upon the extent of a legislature's removal authority.34 
Rather, the unique approach to the separation of legislative and 
judicial powers that the constitutional drafters adopted also limits 
removal authority. Thus, removal of medical malpractice actions may 
occur in some states via statute, but in other states only after 
constitutional amendment.35 
Consider also the legislative authority to delegate certain liti-
gation duties of traditional trial judges to quasi-judicial or para-
judicial officers.36 Questions about such authority have been and are 
currently raised in the federal judiciary with respect to tasks 
33 American Medical Association/Specialty Society Medical Liability Project, A 
Proposed Alternative to the Civil Justice Systemjor Resolving Medical Liability 
Disputes: A Fault-Based, Administrative System (January, 1988). 
34 Other personal rights occasionally asserted during challenges to legislative 
removal of disputes from traditional courts include access to courts, full legal redress 
or remedy, equal protection, and due process. 
Case law is somewhat more developed in the federal system than in most 
though certainly not fully illuminating. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide 
i\gricultural Products Co., 4 73 U.S. 568 ( 1985) (reviewing and applying precedential 
disllnctions between public rights and private rights cases). 
commentary on such officers is found in Parness, The Parajudge-
\l/heels cf Justice, 10 TRIAL54 (March/April, 1974). 
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assigned to magistrates37 and bankruptcy judges.38 Similar ques-
tions on the state level can be answered only after there is a 
comprehensive review of the judicial article and other relevant 
constitutional sources. Para.judicial activity in trial courts is more 
problematic when the responsibilities of trial judges for and during 
litigation are constitutionally defined. 
Another troubling contemporary issue demanding separation of 
powers analysis involves legislative power to cap or abolish certain 
damages. Again, such legislative authority should be easier to 
sustain if the jurisdiction of state courts is subject to legislative 
invention rather than constitutionally defined. Seemingly, a court 
whose power to hear a case is dependent upon legislative will is in a 
weaker position to question a limit or ban on non-economic or 
punitive damages than is a court invested vvith the constitutional 
responsibility to hear and resolve the case. In other words, the court's 
power to make common law rulings contravening statutes is 
somewhat more doubtful when the power to adjudicate the dispute is 
dependent upon statute. 
Unfortunately, at least some courts considering the legitimacy of 
such monetary caps have focused exclusively on the constitutionally-
protected right to jury trial (and other individual rights).39 That 
emphasis seems misplaced because the jury only infrequently 
determines the substantive law. 'Iypically the jury only applies the 
facts the jury finds to the law that others determine. Those courts 
have failed to focus on what their own constitutionally assigned 
tasks of resolving civil disputes encompass. Does the job of civil 
dispute resolution inevitably include the task of establishing, or at 
least helping to enforce, certain substantive law regardless of what 
the legislature says? Is there some deeply-rooted common lawmaking 
37 See, e.g., Gomez v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2237 (1989) (may magistrates 
preside at jui:y selection in felony trials without defendant's consent?); United States 
v. Demarrias, 876 F.2d 67 4 (8th Cir. 1989) (may magistrates accept jui:y verdicts in 
criminal cases when judges are out of town?); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. 
Supp. 151 7 (D. Minn. 1989) (may magistrates accept jui:y verdicts in civil cases after 
sending the jui:y back to complete a special verdict form?). 
38 See, e.g., In re Ben Cooper, Inc., 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1990) (may bankruptcy 
judges preside over certain civil jui:y trials?), cert granted sub nom Insurance Co. of 
Pav. Ben Cooper, 58 U.S.L.W. 3834 (U.S. June 6, 1990) (No. 89-1784). 
39 See, e.g., English v. New England Medical Center. 405 Mass. 423, 541 N.E.2d 
329 ( 1989) ( considering the constitutionality ofa cap on chart table institution's tort 
liability in light of individual jui:y trial, equal protection and due process rights). q 
Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Md. 1989) (addressing the 
constitutionality of a cap on noneconomic damages in light of individual rights and 
separation of powers). Incidentally. litigants' failure to raise separation of powers 
issues normally should not preclude their consideration. 
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troubling contemporary issue 
to fund courts adequately. Such a ,c,:;;,""''"' 
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rnore compelling if there are huge backlogs in cases 
relevant judicial article mandates court jurisdiction over 
cases. The nature of the legislature's funding duty should not 
exclusively on such individual constitutional rights as jury trial, 
anr'es;s to courts or a remedy for every wrong. The mandate that no 
branch of government should unduly burden the ability of 
branch to fulfill its assigned functions is no trivial matter. 
Finally, consider the relevance of differences in current judicial 
to questions about who oversees the practice oflaw; stated 
who regulates admission to legal practice, the discipline of 
lav,yers, judicial ethics, and the like. Many courts simply cite to their 
power, and then declare that such responsibility' lies with 
the judiciary.40 However, such inherent power is easier to rationalize 
courts are constitutionally established and empowered; if the 
courts are constitutionally authorized to hear admission to practice 
lawyer discipline cases; or if rulemaking for the legal profession is 
delegated constitutionally to the courts. Courts whose creation, 
Jurisdiction and rules depend upon the legislature may well have 
inherent power over the legal profession inhering in statute. 
inherent power seems much weaker than judicial power 
deriving from judicial articles that establish courts, define adjudi-
catory duties, and delegate judicial rulemaking responsibilities. 
N. THE DIFFICULTIES IN REsPECTING DIFFERENCES 
IN AMERICAN JUDICIAL ARTICLES 
The awareness of the differences in American judicial articles 
and their relevance to many current issues does not insure sen-
sitivity to the varying separation of powers schemes. In fact, certain 
forces create difficulties for those courts striving to be more sensitive. 
One complicating force is the duty' to be bound, and the desire to 
be guided, by federal law. In particular, troubles often ensue because 
of the fundamental differences between constitutional rights and 
constitutional judicial systems. In the area of individual rights, 
federal guarantees stand as the minimum threshold below which no 
state may go. Thus, in many cases involving state constitutional 
w For a critical examination of two differing state high court declarations about 
ability to mandate openness in judicial rulemaking, see Parness, Com-
American Judicial Systems, 24 U. RICH. L. REv. 171, 181-6 (1990). 
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rights, courts must first consider federal rights. In addition, notwith-
standing such notable exceptions as the right to privacy, state courts 
often look to federal case law for guidance on the scope of state law 
because many state constitutional rights are grounded in language 
comparable to the language in the federal Constitution. 
There is today, however, little federal constitutional constraint 
on the establishment of state judicial systems. Federal law says little 
about the separation of legislative and judicial responsibilities for a 
state's legal profession.41 Little federal due process or equal protection 
authority addresses whether there should be state trial courts of 
limited jurisdiction, some form of legislative power to influence 
judicial rules, or state-funded courts. Thus, the federal Constitution42 
appears to permit considerable state variations on those and other 
related questions, but not on many questions of individual rights. 
Also, the judicial article of the federal Constitution has not been 
significantly amended since the nation's founding.43 Furthermore, 
the United States Constitution delegates to Congress enormous 
discretion regarding the establishment and empowerment of federal 
courts.44 Many state judicial articles have a different history and 
content. The illinois experience and the comparison of state judicial 
articles governing court structure and judicial rulemaking exemplify 
those differences. Thus, employing federal precedents as guides to 
41 Professor Wolfram has vvritten: "Separation of powers doctrines of state and 
federal constitutional law. in general terms. do not directly affect each other. Thus no 
federal constitutional principle the st:'1tes to follow, or restricts the states 
from adopting, any particular concept.ion of separation of powers among the 
branches of state government" Wolfram. MoDERl\l LEGAL Ennes 33 (West Pub. Co. 
1986). In the absence of federal limits. states have chosen differing paths. Compare, 
e.g., ARK CONST. amend. 28 ('The Supreme Court shall makes rules regulating the 
practice oflaw and the professional conduct of attorneys at law."); with N.D. CONST. 
art. VI,§ 3 ("The supreme court shall have authority ... unless otheIWise provided by 
law, to promulgate rules and regulations for the admission to practice, conduct 
disciplining, and disbarment of attorneys at law." ); and, S.D. CONST. art. V, § 12 ("The 
Supreme Court by rule shall govern ... admission to the bar, and discipline of 
members of the bar. These rules may be changed by the legislature."). 
42 U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people."). 
43 But see U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall 
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State."). 
44 U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested 
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to 
time ordain and establish."). The limits on such discretion are unclear. Gunther. 
Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide 
to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895 ( 1984 ). 
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questions involving 
in overseeing the legal profession 
between federal and state constitutional theory 
power create further difficulties for those courts 
respecting their state's unique approach. Again, the 
!,;;,,,-,,"'""'"' °''''"'""",''"'''"' is often misleading. Debates about the values of 
founding fathers and about original intent, typically 
consideration of questions of federal constitutional 
are usually inappropriate during debates on state judicial 
Unlike article III of the federal Constitution which governs 
judiciary, state judicial articles have been frequently 
Those amendments often reflect differing views about the 
role of the legislature in regulating the judiciary. The result is 
in many states, more legislative history and differing consti-
theories exist than with the federal Constitution. Thus, it is 
necessary to read a state constitutional provision on the 
in the context not only of the current judicial article, but 
in the context of earlier judicial articles in which the same 
appeared. 
It is possible for the meaning of a single state constitutional 
to have changed over time because its context has been 
Unfortunately, that change is not always recognized. For 
many state constitutions contain a longstanding provision 
the state's judicial power in a supreme court. Occasionally, 
courts read such provisions comparably over time, even though other 
provisions in their judicial article have been subject to 
a.111endment.Amendments have often yielded provisions recognizing 
high court's rulemaking power, or eliminating references to the 
legislature's influence on high court jurisdiction and court-promul-
rules. Such amendments should affect judicial interpretations 
provisions vesting judicial power in a high court. 
Thus, the so-called inherent power of a high court should vary 
\Vith the amendments of the judicial article provisions governing 
that court. This analysis further suggests that dangers exist in the 
rather commonplace practice of one state court using a second 
state's precedents to determine the parameters of inherent judicial 
power.45 As American judicial articles vary on matters of court 
strncture, court rulemaking, court financing and the like, so, too, 
should the unwritten, inherent powers of American courts vary from 
state to state. 
unfortunate use is reviewed in Parness, supra note 40, at 181-6. 
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Finally, the need to examine the model provisions or recom-
mended standards of such national groups as the American Bar 
Association, the American Judicature Society, and the National 
Municipal League further complicates inquiries into the consti-
tutional histoiy of a state judicial article. The works of these bodies 
are relevant because each body promulgated a series of proposals this 
centu:iy which gained the attention of at least some state constitu-
tional drafters. Yet, the proposals of these national organizations 
have differed with each other, and each organization's proposals 
have been changed over time.46 Perhaps these changes help to 
explain the differing approaches today to the concept of a unified 
court system. The need to consider the varying reforms suggested by 
national organizations certainly adds to the difficulties involved in 
respecting differences in separation of powers principles among 
states. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Extensive variations now exist in American constitutional 
provisions on the judiciary. Those variations frequently compel 
different relationships between the legislature and the courts. 
Nonetheless, those variations are often overlooked by courts and 
commentators. Perhaps as a result, an incorrect impression of 
comparability has developed, which presumes similarity from state 
to state in such matters as the balance of legislative and judicial 
duties regarding the legal profession. The time has come to recognize 
fully the differences in American judicial articles, as well as the 
rationales underlying the varying approaches that our state gov-
ernments have taken. Such a sensitivity should prompt more 
informed, though perhaps seemingly inconsistent, state judicial 
decisions in such troubling areas as administrative agency adjudi-
cation, the use of parajudicial officers, statutoiy limits on damages, 
the adequacy of court funding, and the regulation of the legal 
profession. Yet, respect for the differences in state judicial articles 
often will not be easy. Complications will arise because differences 
exist in the content and histoiy of the federal Constitution and 
because difficulties exist in assessing state constitutional histoiy. 
46 Ashman and Parness, supra note 32, at 5-17. 
